From 1904-1905, Russia and Japan were locked in conflict arising from rival imperial ambitions over Manchuria and Korea. Here, Nicholas Papastratigakis offers an integrated analysis of Russian naval strategy in the decade preceding this Russo-Japanese War, in which the Russians suffered catastrophic defeat. This book seeks to determine the extent to which their defeat can be attributed to flawed Tsarist naval policy at the turn of the twentieth century. While concentrating on analysing naval developments in the Far East, the book also places Russian naval strategy within the broader context of imperialism, and the larger political and historical context. Rooted in rich primary resources from Russian, French and British archives, including Russian naval archives which have only recently become accessible to international scholars, this is the first book to examine this crucial period of Russian naval strategy - addressing an important gap in the literature. Russian Imperialism and Naval Power not only enhances our knowledge of Russia's conduct in international affairs in the decades preceding the World War I but also contributes to our understanding of the modernisation of Russia and the limits of the Tsarist regime. It also brings important new insights to imperial history and comparative naval and military history. Meticulously researched and engagingly written, this book will be of enormous interest to scholars and students of naval, military, imperial and Russian history.
Russian Imperialism and Naval Power
Military Strategy and the Build-up to the Russo-Japanese War