The confrontation with Indonesia cut to the heart of Britain's desire to retain global power status in the 1960s and was central to decolonisation and British defence policy across South-East Asia. Factors such as the need to maintain a military base in Singapore and protect newly established Malaysia, drove strategy and made this a major commitment - close at times to escalating into full-scale regional war. However, 'the Confrontation' was not recorded as a conflict of this scale, and Britain was cast into only a passive and defensive role. Here, David Easter reveals a radically different view, persuasively making the case that Britain waged a secret war against President Sukarno's Indonesia - supporting rebel groups, spreading propaganda and carrying out clandestine cross-border raids so as to protect her regional and international interests. It was the covert nature of operations and the deliberate decision of British policy-makers to keep the full extent of this conflict away from public scrutiny that has allowed it to be obscured in the annals of history.
Britain and the Confrontation with Indonesia, 1960-66